Bringing institutional theory and the signalling effect of patents in the debate, we investigate how to mitigate IPO underpricing in different appropriability regimes. Empirical evidence remains that in the industry with a transparent link between R&D expenditures and value appropriation, the level of R&D expenditures does not even have a negative impact on IPO underpricing and a venture's patent stock effectively mitigates investors' concerns of its future prospect. Conversely, when the link between innovations and future returns is unclear, the endorsing legitimacy is extremely prevalent, especially for high-tech IPOs. Post hoc analysis shows that it does decrease the level of IPO underpricing caused by innovation-based information asymmetry, proxied by the R&D expenditures. The result extends information asymmetry theory by considering institutional prospective and by contextualizing firm information. It also contributes to institutional theory by showing how this theory contributes most to our understanding of firm behaviour in the absence of well functioning markets (e.g., market for technology).
IntroductIon
Young ventures usually have a high amount of intangible assets, negative cash flow and great technological and/or market uncertainty (Baeyens & Manigart, 2003) . Once they have grown out of the venture capital phase, they need to raise money on the stock market to finance their growth path. However, substantial evidence shows that entrepreneurs tend to sell their shares at the price lower than actual market value on their initial public offerings (IPOs) to attract investors (Loughran & Ritter, 2002) . In the IPO market, information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders is the widely accepted explanation for IPO underpricing (Rock, 1986) . Young ventures, which are based on novel technologies, do generate lots of information asymmetries because it is difficult to assess their real potential (Aboody & Lev, 2000; Heeley, Matusik, & Jain, 2007) . This explains why those ventures are usually more seriously underpriced than companies with a track record in an easy to understand industry. However, although information asymmetry theory explains why underpricing happens in these cases, it has little to say how to avoid this underpricing. We attempt to address this gap by including an analysis of the signalling effect of patent stocks and introducing an institutional perspective in the debate. Research questions includes (1) how does the signalling of patents and endorsing legitimacy affect a venture's IPO price, taking into account the level of information asymmetry and (2) how does the appropriability regime of the industry in which the venture operates moderate the signalling effects.
Empirical results from a sample of 770 IPOs issued by manufacturing firms during 1995-2006 support our hypothesis that the link between R&D expenditures and value appropriation does play a more important role than initially thought. In the industries where the link is clear, the level of innovation-based information asymmetry does not even have a negative impact on IPO underpricing and a venture's patent stock can effectively mitigate investors' concerns of its future prospect. Conversely, when the link is unclear, affiliations are prevalent to serves as a credible and observable signal for the investment community to assess firm value. Post hoc analysis shows that endorsing legitimacy does decrease the level of IPO underpricing and the innovation-based information asymmetry in those industries where the appropriability regime tends to be weak. This research extends information asymmetry theory by introducing institutional theory into the debate. The endorsing legitimacy is a critical quality signal for new venture, especially for hightech IPOs to influences investors' assessments of their value. It also contributes to institutional theory by showing how this theory contributes most to our understanding of firm behaviour in the absence of well functioning markets (e.g., market for technology).
the underprIcIng of InItIAl publIc offerIng And InformAtIon AsymmetrIes
Underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) occurs when the initial offered price is lower than the closing price at the end of the first day of trading. Substantial evidence shows that when young ventures go public, they tend to discount their offering prices to attract investors (Ibbotson, Sindelar, & Ritter, 1988; Loughran & Ritter, 2002) . In the 1980s, the average discount was around 7.4%; it then rose to 14.8% from 1990 to 1998; and from 1999 to 2000, it sharply reached to 65%. In dollar terms, compared to the average profits that these same companies earn in the year before they go public, the amount of money they left on the table is higher than their three-year aggregate profits ( Loughran & Ritter, 2002) 1 . Researchers have examined a variety of explanations for the underpricing phenomenon such as underwriter reputation (Carter, Dark, & Singh, 1998) , venture capital backing (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy Iii, & Vetsuypens, 1990) , firm size (Ibbotson, et al., 1988) , and firm age (Megginson & Weiss, 1991) . The leading theory is Rock's (1986) argument, winner's curse model, which argues that information asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders causes the investor community's hesitation to the potential of the issuing firms (Christensen, 2002) . The information gaps force investors to reduce investments in order to avoid their anticipated agency costs (Chahine & Filatotchev, 2008 ). An increase (decrease) in the level of information asymmetry related to assessing the true value is positively associated with a corresponding increase (decrease) in the amount of underpricing (Heeley, et al., 2007) .
For entrepreneurs, underpricing is very costly. Thus bridging information gaps is particularly important yet a difficult activity due to their limited observable history of performance. Although information asymmetry theory explains why underpricing happens, the theory has little to say how to avoid it. Previous entrepreneurship literature has investigated many mechanisms such as founders' backgrounds (Certo, Daily, & Dalton, 2001 ) and the endorsement from the third party (Hsu, 2004; Stuart, et al., 1999) , which are used to reduce information asymmetries. However there are relatively few studies considering how the signalling effects of those mechanisms change in different contexts and how investors actually render those signals.
hypothesIs development

Innovation and Information Asymmetry
Previous studies have found that information asymmetries are highly correlated with a firm's R&D expenditure due to the nature of uncertainty (Guo, Lev, & Shi, 2006; Heeley, et al., 2007) . As Research, Vol. 32 [2012], Iss. 14, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol32/iss14/1 the level of R&D expenditures increases, so does the amount of information necessary to judge the value of innovations. When investors find it difficult to evaluate the real quality of ventures financial backing might be hard to be secured by ventures (Hall, 2008; Leland & Pyle, 1977) .
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Frontiers of Entrepreneurship
Moreover, the level of uncertainty or information asymmetries is not uniform in different contexts (Levin, et al., 1987; Warshofsky, 1994) . In some contexts the link between R&D investments and appropriating value is transparent but in others it is not (Heeley, et al., 2007) . For instance, young ventures have a choice between competition strategy (e.g., entering the product market) and cooperation strategy (e.g., entering the technology market) (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2002) . The success of chosen strategy depends on the venture's unique capabilities and resource configurations. Ventures which choose to license their technologies focus on developing their technology basis and building up a strong IP portfolio (Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001 ). In contrast, ventures participating in the market for products generate value from productionrelated activities which might require significant investments in co-specialized assets (Arora, et al., 2001; Teece, 1986) . They need capabilities to manage multiple uncertainties which are related to transforming the technology into new products and convincing customers of a new value proposition (Gans & Stern, 2003) . Thus, these different strategies (entering the market for products or the market for technology) influence the amount and complexity of information necessary for investors to evaluate a venture's potential (Gans, et al., 2002; Teece, 1986) .
Value Appropriability of a Venture's Commercialization Strategy in Different Industrial Contexts
The profits from different commercialization strategies are contingent on the strength of the appropriability regime within the industry and the extent to which firms control complementary assets (Gans & Stern, 2003) . The key determinant of appropriability regime is the efficiency of legal mechanisms of protection and the uncertainty about the value of the technology (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; Gans, et al., 2002) . While bargaining with incumbents, ventures in the environments with tight intellectual property rights (IPR) might have a chance to avoid the threat of expropriation, so that competition strategy could be a good choice. However, even with tight appropriability regimes, sometimes the appropriability of innovation is skewed (Cohen, et al., 2000; Levin, et al., 1987) . In some industries, products only need a relatively small number of elements and the value of each element is clear; whereas, in some industries, products are complicated. Cohen et al. (2000) categorize the products including numerous elements (i.e., electronic products) as complex technology and those rely on relatively few factors (i.e., new drugs) as discrete technology (Kash & Kingston, 2001; Levin, et al., 1987) .
In the discrete products industry, the potential outcomes generated by each dollar of R&D investment are relatively high since each is characterised by a relatively low innovation number (Levin, et al., 1987) . Also, technologies applied usually can be understood by an individual and precisely transmitted across firms (Rycroft & Kash, 1999) . For example, pharmaceuticals formula is comprehensible to all trained chemists. The consensus on components of the technology shared by experts helps firms to demonstrate monopoly rights and make technology licensing possible. In contrast, in the complex product industry, it is difficult to conceive of each innovation's usefulness in the future. Moreover, complex technologies are synthetic systems which consist of diverse knowledge (Kash & Kingston, 2001; Rycroft & Kash, 1999) , thus technology transfer is a complicated process. Also, because of the large number of elements that complex products need, the same performance normally can be achieved by different combinations. Incumbents are not easy to determine which innovation is more valuable. Competitors are also able to destroy the value of one innovation by filing 'engineer around' patents (Kash & Kingston, 2001 ). Therefore, this research hypothesizes that: 3
Hypothesis 1: In a complex industry, the impact of information asymmetries caused by R&D expenditures on IPO underpricing is stronger than that in a discrete product industry.
Quality Signals of Ventures
Previous research has investigated many proxies to reduce information asymmetries. However, most of them assume signal receivers are placed on the receiving end of discourse. Few studies consider how evaluators actually render quality signals in different industrial contexts.
The Signalling Effect of Patents
Theoretically patents are a potential proxy for ventures to shows their innovation achievements (Conti, et al., 2011; Heeley, et al., 2007) . However, the signalling effect of patents is noisy. Firstly, according to Patent Law, the disclosure is only sufficient to someone who is "skilled in the art". Thus, the patent disclosure only provides limited information to majority of investors (Heeley, et al., 2007) . Secondly, the function of patents as well as the level of value appropriability changes across industries (e.g., Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Heeley, et al., 2007) . Surveys (Cohen, et al., 2000; Levin, et al., 1987; Ceccagnoli, Graham, Higgins, & Lee, 2010) show that the protection of patents is stronger to firms in life science and chemical industries than to companies in information technology-related sectors. Other surveys of patenting behaviours during 1979-1995 in the U.S. also support this point (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001) . Although there is a remarkable increase in patenting in the semiconductor industry, the main purpose to file patents is to use patents as a trading currency to access other technologies (Kash & Kingston, 2001 ).
In the complex products industry, a large number of interacting components which a product needs not only makes investors without diverse knowledge difficult to discern the usefulness of each innovation but also causes the relatively weak utility of each patent (Hsu & Ziedonis, 2011) . Moreover, if any of the components is patented, without the license for it, the profit which a venture can capture from its innovation is limited (Kash & Kingston, 2001) . In these cases, patenting as many components of the technology as possible is an inevitable investment to avoid possible lockout and to establish a strongest position for cross-licensing. However, compared with incumbents' boundaries of specialized assets, the innovation stocks of younger ventures are comparatively small, so that the stock usually only increases R&D expenditures but provides limited guarantee for future returns. Furthermore, the uncertainty about the value of each technology in a complex product industry further increases the transaction costs on technology licensing. Thus, the market for technology might be not a profitable option Hypothesis 2: In a discrete industry, the impact of patent stock on reducing IPO underpricing is stronger than that in a complex product industry.
The Signalling Effect of Legitimacy
Among a variety of quality signals, researchers have identified that the most central of these combines signalling theory with institutional theory, which considers firms' endeavouring for legitimacy in order to survive (Certo, 2003) . Legitimacy, on the one hand, is embedded in a system of institutionalized beliefs. Audiences are more likely to supply resources to organizations that seem desirable or appropriate (Parson, 1960) . On the other hand, the cultural congruence captured by legitimacy increases a firm's credibility (Jepperson, 1991) . Legitimation is extremely critical for young ventures (Carroll, 1983; Stuart, et al., 1999) . With little or no observable history and high uncertainty of technologies, the investor community 4 Frontiers of Entrepreneurship Research, Vol. 32 [2012] , Iss. 14, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol32/iss14/1 normally doubts a issuing firm' quality (Certo, et al., 2001) and concerns a venture's true intention in seeking external financing (Mouri, Sarkar, & Frye, 2011) . As Stuart et al. (1999) states, "because the quality of young companies often cannot be observed directly, evaluators must evaluate the company based on other observable attributes that are thought to co-vary with its underlying but unknown quality". Previous research has found endorsements from ventures' alliances serve as a certification of their intrinsic value and enhance their perceived quality (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Podolny, 1994; Stuart, et al., 1999) . Their affiliations can alleviate misgivings that external investors may have by showing that they are able to access to abundant resources which can increase their survival prospects (Reuer & Tong, 2010; Singh & Mitchell, 2005) .
In a complex product industry, the market for technology is imperfect (Gans & Stern, 2003; Teece, 1986) . It is also very challenging for a venture to develop its technology and establish production and distribution activities simultaneously (Pries & Guild, 2007) . The uncertainty of a venture's earning potential in either market for technology or for products might hinder investors from correctly evaluating a venture's quality, so that the importance of endorsing legitimacy might be more prevalent for ventures in a complex product industry. Affiliations are presumed to be correlated with quality and yet are more observable than quality itself (Podolny, 1994) .
Hypothesis 3a: In a complex industry, the impact of signalling legitimacy on reducing IPO underpricing is stronger than that in a discrete product industry.
For high-tech ventures, endorsing legitimacy plays a more critical role to help them establish confidence on their quality. Compared with incumbents with experiences on innovation projects (Nohria & Gulati, 1996) and resource slack to absorb failure (Galunic & Rodan, 1998; Majchrzak, Cooper, & Neece, 2004) , young ventures face high existential risks if the innovation fails. Moreover, given the low transparency of value appropriation and the absence of well functioning markets in a complex product industry, only young ventures with endorsing legitimacy might be able to decrease the information asymmetry caused by the uncertain technological and/or market environment in which they operate. Their affiliations signal their unobservable value and make their behaviours become more predictable (Jepperson, 1991) . Thus, this research hypothesizes that:
Hypothesis 3b: In a complex product industry, the impact of signalling legitimacy can reduce IPO underpricing which caused by high R&D expenditures.
The influence of endorsing legitimacy from affiliations is not equal across different types of alliance partners. Stuart et al. (1999) show that there is an "implicit transfer of status across inter-organizational exchange relations (such as inter-corporate equity and alliance ties), which builds confidence about the quality of a new venture." Prominent firms risk their reputation when they build relationships with young ventures; thus prominent firms have a correspondingly strong incentive to avoid low-quality exchange partners (Podolny, 1994; Stuart, et al., 1999) . The exclusiveness turns to be an endorsement for a venture to distinguish itself from low quality ventures (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Stuart, et al., 1999) . Previous research also shows that alliances with prominence partners can improve a firm's visibility among numerous unaffiliated organizations and enlarge its set of prospective investors (Reuer & Tong, 2010) . This endorsement is more prevalent for R&D intensive ventures. Partners with technological prominence referring to firms with many influential innovations are competent and selective judges of the technological potential of ventures in their areas of expertise; hence, the affiliation with technological prominent partners is like a certification of a venture's technological ability (Stuart, et al., 1999) . In addition, in complex technology industries, investors require information not only regarding the technology itself but also about the portion of the rent from the innovation that will accrue to a venture. Carter and Manaster (1990) . This research deleted firms with an offer price below $5 dollars (Heeley, et al., 2007) .
IPO underpricing is measured by the percent change in the stock price of a firm during its first day of trading ([closing price -offer price]/offer price). R&D intensity was measured as the ratio of R&D expenditure divided by sales in the year prior to their IPO and was taken log transformation to account for the skewness in the data and controlled by assets in the year prior to the initial public offering (Guo, et al., 2006) . Patent stock is measured by the number of patents a firm had in the five years prior to its IPO for two reasons. Firstly, recent patents show a firm's inventive abilities at the time of IPO. Secondly, previous research shows that rarely do patent protection last for 20 years from the date of filing but a relatively short period (Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner, 1981) . The alliance dummy is measured by whether a firm has an alliance relationship in the five years prior to its IPOs. (A five year window is widely accepted in the literature as an adequate period to measure a firm's alliances (Gulati, 1995) because normally the duration of alliances is no more than five years (Kogut, 1988 (Kogut, , 1989 ). The technological prominence of the alliance partners 2 was measured by the number of patent citation in the five years prior to a focal firm's IPO. To measure appropriability regime, this research used ISIC code to separate IPOs into discrete or complex product industries (Cohen, et al., 2000) . Industries with ISIC code lower than 2900 were defined as discrete product industry (e.g., pharmaceutical) and coded as high appropriability, whereas those ISIC code of 2900 or higher were identified as complex product industry (e.g., electrical equipments) and coded as low appropriability.
Control Variable
This research controlled firm age and size which measured by years since founding and assets in the year prior to the IPO respectively. To account for skewness in the data, we took logtransformation on the two variables. Averagely older firms have more public records about their value, more patents, and low information asymmetry. We used a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm found by venture capital. Some research indicated venture capital backing decrease IPO underpricing because of the certification and monitoring role of venture capitalists (Barry, et al., 1990; Megginson & Weiss, 1991) . However, recently, some studies found that the relationship between venture capitalists and IPO underpricing is complicated. Some of them found that VCbacked offerings were more underpriced (Brav & Gompers, 2003) and some of them showed no difference in underpricing between new public firms with and without VC backing after 6
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Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol32/iss14/1 controlling for market exchange and underwriter (Bradley & Jordan, 2002) . To account for the effect of underwriter reputation, this research followed Loughran and Ritter's (2004) prestigious underwriter backing. This research also counted the number of IPOs in the same industry in one prior year to a focal firm's IPO to control the effect of hot markets characterized by rotating periods of significant activity (Heeley, et al., 2007) . Prior research has found that hot markets are related to higher underpricing than cold markets (Ritter, 1984) . This research used lagged market return measured by weighted return for the 30-day pre-IPO period to control the impact of recent market conditions which are excluded in the final offer price. According to Logue's research (1973) , underwriters might price IPOs independently of market conditions and the result in the study showed a positive relationship between pre IPO market returns and IPO first-day returns. In addition, we included industrial technology dummies to control the level of technology (high, low, and stable), following by Chandler's (1994) industry classifications. Finally, to account for macroeconomic factors, this research used annual dummy variables in all regression analyses. The sectoral patenting trend was measured by the number of patents granted per year in each sector. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample of IPO firms. The mean of IPO underpricing is 25.16 percent. 87.4 percent of our sample conducted R&D and 50 percent filed patents prior to the IPO, which shows the importance of innovation for manufacturing firms. The means of R&D intensity and patent stocks were 5.07 percent and 18.38 respectively. In full sample, 25.5 percent of focal firms had effective alliance partners and the mean of partners' patent citations was 341.11 times. The average age was 18 years, average assets was 440.53 million dollars at the time of IPO. In addition, 55.7 percent of focal firms were backed by venture capitalists and their underwriters' average reputation score is 5.95.
results
Descriptive Statistics
To further examine how the effects of R&D intensity and quality signals on IPO underpricing change in different contexts, we separated our sample into two groups based on the transparency of value appropriation: the complex product industry and the discrete product industry. We found that the proportions of focal firms conducting R&D and filing patents prior to their IPOs were similar in both groups but the mean of R&D intensity was greater in the group characterized by high transparency (8.1%) than the other group (4.12%). This pattern means that the level of innovation-based information asymmetry was higher in a discrete product industry. However, the average number of patents was higher in a complex product industry. The proportion of ventures with alliance partners is no big different between two groups but the mean of partners' technological status was relatively higher in a discrete product industry (the average time of patent citations was 552.6) than that in a complex product industry (the average time of patent citations was 275.65). In addition, comparing to firm assets, firm size in a discrete product industry (914.8 million dollars) was bigger than that of the other group (292.72 million dollars) but the average age of firms in a discrete product industry (12.97 years) was younger than the other (19.62 year).
In Table 2 , we conducted Bivariate correlations to further explore the relationships between variables. We found that the sectoral patenting trend was positively correlated with IPO underpricing meaning that IPOs in the industry with a stronger patenting trend experienced more underpricing. Firm age was negatively correlated with IPO underpricing suggesting that older firms were less underpriced. There was a positive correlation between underpricing and the measure of lagged market returns, supporting previous research which argues that offering prices did not fully reflect recent market situations. We also found a negative correlation between 7 the stable-technology and underpricing and a positive correlation between high-technology and underpricing. This result means that higher R&D expenditures are correlated with a higher level of information asymmetries. Additionally the result shows that VC backing and underwriter reputation were positively correlated with underpricing. This pattern means that the role of venture capital is consistent with Brav and Gompers's finding (2003) and that agency problems of underwriters which Loughran and Ritter (2004) argued do exists. The result also shows a negative correlation between R&D intensity and our measures of patent stocks and firm assets. However, the correlations between R&D expenses and these two measures (r=0.299, p<0.001 and r=0.557, p<0.001 respectively) and between sales and these two measures (r=0.864, p<0.001 and r=0.244, p<0.001 respectively) were positive. The correlation between R&D expenditure and firm sales was positive (r=0.350, p<0.001). Moreover, although the correlation between R&D expenditures and firm age was not significant, the coefficient was positive and the correlation between sales and firm age was positive (r=0.327, p<0.001). It means firms with higher R&D expenditures or with higher sales have more patents and bigger or elderly firms have more R&D expenditures and sales. However, the increase in sales was higher than the increase in R&D expenditures. Besides, there was no significant correlation between R&D intensity and underpricing, patent stock and underpricing, and endorsing legitimacy and underpricing. Thus, we further divided sample into two groups to explore how the relationships change in different contexts. Table 3 shows the results of the regression analysis in two groups. We started by estimating a model that showed the effect of control variables (model 1). The result shows that in a discrete product industry, the asymmetry in the information about a firm's value is relatively low; thus, most of the effects of control variables to IPO underpricing were not significant. In a complex product industry, we found that effect of VC backing was negative and significant, providing a support for Brav and Gompers' findings (2003) which argue that VC-backed offerings were more underpriced. The same as prior research, the result also shows the effect of lagged market returns was positive and significant. Although the effect of hot market was not significant, the effect of hot markets could be encapsulated in the annual dummies. The result also showed no differences in the level of underpricing between the low-technology, stable-technology, and high-technology groups. However, the lack of an effect of firm age and assets were surprising. The pattern suggests that relationships between information asymmetries, firm age, and sizes are more complicated in recent years (Ibbotson, et al., 1988; Megginson & Weiss, 1991) . The absence of a negative underwriter reputation effect was unexpected. Nevertheless, to some extent, the positive effect is in line with Loughran and Ritter's (2004) agency hypothesis regarding to the role of underwriters.
Empirical Analysis
In examining the effect of R&D intensity on IPO underpricing, we found a significant curvilinear effect in a complex product industry but no significant effect in a discrete product industry, which meaning that information asymmetry caused by R&D expenditures did not cause IPO underpricing in the industry with transparent link between innovations and value appropriation (model 2). Figure 1 depicts the relationship between R&D intensity and IPO underpricing in the complex product industry. The absolute effect of R&D intensity on underpricing was positive until the level of R&D intensity reached 139.7 (ln [R&D intensity*100 +1] =9.54). In our sample, this value is above the 99th quantile in the R&D intensity distribution, meaning that the impact of R&D intensity on IPO underpricing is positive for most cases in a complex product industry in model 2. According to the result of log-test, the impact of R&D intensity on IPO underpricing is stronger in a complex product industry; thus we found a support for hypothesis 1. Regarding the effect of patent stock, we found a significantly negative effect (p < 0.05) on reducing IPO underpricing in a 8 Research, Vol. 32 [2012], Iss. 14, Art. 1 Posted at Digital Knowledge at Babson http://digitalknowledge.babson.edu/fer/vol32/iss14/1 discrete product industry but not in a complex product industry. The result also showed that the impact of patent stock on reducing IPO underpricing is stronger in a discrete product industry. This result is qualified to support for hypothesis 2a. Moreover, in model 2, the result also revealed negative effect (p < 0.05) of endorsing legitimacy on IPO underpricing in a complex product industry but no significant effect in a discrete product industry, which supporting hypothesis 3a (the result of log-test supported this hypothesis). New ventures with endorsing legitimacy in a complex product industry can mitigate IPO underpricing. In model 3, we examined the effects of alliance partners' technological status on reducing IPO underpricing caused by high R&D expenditures in a complex product industry. We found no significant moderating effect; thus there is no support for hypothesis 3c.
Frontiers of Entrepreneurship
To examine the moderating effect of alliance relationships on reducing underpricing which caused by innovation-based information asymmetries in a complex product industry, we further separated sample into two groups, one with alliance partners and one without alliance partners. For new ventures with alliance partners, Table 4 shows no support for the positive relationship between R&D intensity and IPO underpricing; whereas, for ventures without alliance partners, higher R&D intensity significantly caused their IPO underpricing (model 7). Thus, this result supports hypothesis 3b (the result of log-test supported this hypothesis).
Supplemental Analysis
To investigate the effect of endorsing legitimacy further, we compared the impacts of effective alliance relationships and announced alliance relationships (parts of them were in the pending phrase). In model 5 in Table 3 , we found that both of them can significantly reduce IPO underpricing. Thus, the impacts of effective and announced alliances are no different.
dIscussIon And conclusIons
Previous research has well established how information asymmetries cause IPO underpricing, especially the information gap resulted from high R&D expenditures. We contribute to further explore how the level of this innovation-based information asymmetry changes in different industrial contexts and eventually has a different impact on IPO underpricing. In addition to examine how the level of information asymmetries increases/ decreases, we consider how to mitigate this underpricing by delivering positive quality signals.
Our results show the level of information asymmetries on IPO underpricing is contextdependent. In a discrete product industry, although R&D expenditures increase, ventures' offering prices are not significantly discounted. In contrast, in a complex product industry, innovation activities increase the need for firm specific information and the level of information asymmetries. In looking at the impact of quality signals on bridging information gaps, we consider how investors actually render these signals in different contexts. Firstly, the signalling effect of patents is contingent on the transparency of innovations to value appropriation. In a discrete product industry, products consists of a relatively small innovation number and the technologies applied usually can be precisely transmitted across firms (Rycroft & Kash, 1999) . Thus, increasing patenting is a signal of higher profit-earning potential and a strong safeguard of monopoly rent from innovation investments. Conversely, in a complex product industry, the value of patents is constrained by industrial appropriability regimes and the complexity of technologies. Due to the imperfect function of the market for technology, many technologies lack a predictable market (Kash & Kingston, 2001 ). Thus patenting is only linked with higher R&D expenditures.
In addition, ventures in a complex product industry normally lack proprietary controls over all the essential complementary components underlying their products. Once any of components is patented, without the license for it, does the returns of investments on relevant components drop.
Secondly, we introduce an institutional perspective in the debate. When the market for technology is imperfect, patents cannot guarantee positive cash flow in the future. The importance of endorsing legitimacy, hence, becomes more prevalent. Affiliations communicate the positive information by showing that ventures are able to access to more resources which increase their survival prospects and growth opportunities (Reuer & Tong, 2010; Singh & Mitchell, 2005) . Thus, in this case, signalling legitimacy can help ventures to convince investors about their earning potential. Moreover, not only the effective alliances but also the announced alliances do deliver the same positive information to the investors.
In examining the moderating effects of quality signals including alliance affiliations and alliance partners' technological status on reducing IPO underpricing which caused by high R&D investment, young ventures' affiliations do establish confidence on their quality and significantly reduce innovation-based information asymmetries. However, we do not find significant support on the effect of partners' technological status. The possible reason is that only very small portion of ventures' partners has patent citations (only 17.5% in the full sample and 15.6% in the group of complex product industry). Therefore, the sample size is too small to analyze the impact of partners' technological status on reducing innovation-based information asymmetries.
In considering the bias of endogeneity, one criticism might be that high quality ventures normally experience less underpricing because of the quality itself not because of the effects of quality signals. However, previous research has confirmed that underpricing is also one of quality signals for high quality ventures to distinguish themselves from poor competitors (Allen & Faulhaber, 1989; Garfinkel, 1993) . Information asymmetries do exist in the IPO market. Low quality ventures usually imitate all strategies which high quality ventures use. Underpricing is the only signal which is too costly for low quality ventures to mimic because managers of low quality ventures know that they cannot recoup the initial loss at some future date.
This research contributes to information asymmetry theory. Firstly, we introduce institutional theory into the debate. In the IPO market, underpricing is not the only way for firms to induce investors. Previous research overlooked the impact of institutional factors. The endowment of legitimacy is a critical quality signal for young ventures, especially for high-tech IPOs to increase investors' assessments of their value. Secondly, we contextualize information asymmetry theory in different appropriability regimes. The level of information asymmetries in IPO markets is not uniform across industrial contexts. In the industries with a transparent link between innovations and value creation, the level of information asymmetry, proxied by the R&D expenditures of those ventures, does not even have a negative impact on IPO underpricing. Therefore, the judgment of value creation from innovation is only meaningful within a context. Our results also extend institutional theory by considering how evaluators actually render legitimacy and by showing how this theory contributes most to our understanding of firm behaviour in the absence of well functioning markets (such as the market for technology). Previous literatures mostly focus on how a firm establishes its legitimacy to increase its survival prospect. However, from this point of view, evaluators, thus, only play passive roles and are placed on the receiving end of discourse. This research considers evaluators' active cognitive processing and how their evolution of an IPO firms changes because of the quality signals they receive. In addition, our results show the function of institutional factors when the market for technology is imperfect. Endorsing legitimacy serves as an important proxy to mitigate information asymmetries and makes the market for technology become a potential option for investors.
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